By Willard C. Matthias
This survey of greater than fifty years of nationwide safety coverage juxtaposes declassified U.S. nationwide intelligence estimates with lately published Soviet files disclosing the perspectives of Soviet leaders and their Communist allies at the related occasions. Matthias indicates that U.S. intelligence estimates have been often right yet that our political and army leaders ordinarily neglected them—with occasionally disastrous effects. The e-book starts with a glance again on the function of U.S. intelligence in the course of international conflict II, from Pearl Harbor during the plot opposed to Hitler and the D-Day invasion to the "unconditional quit" of Japan, and divulges how higher use of the intelligence on hand can have stored many lives and shortened the warfare. the subsequent chapters facing the chilly struggle divulge what info and suggestion U.S. intelligence analysts handed directly to policymakers, and in addition what occasionally sour coverage debates happened in the Communist camp, referring to Vietnam, the Bay of Pigs, the Cuban missile main issue, the turmoil in japanese Europe, the Six-Day and Yom Kippur wars within the heart East, and the Soviet intervention in Afganistan. in lots of methods, it is a tale of neglected possibilities the U.S. govt needed to behavior a extra dependable international coverage that may have kept away from huge losses of lifestyles and big charges on fingers buildups. whereas no longer exonerating the CIA for its personal blunders, Matthias casts new mild at the contributions that aim intelligence research did make through the chilly warfare and speculates on what may have occurred if that evaluation and suggestion have been heeded.
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Additional info for America's Strategic Blunders: Intelligence Analysis and National Security Policy, 1936-1991
I n t e l l i g e n c e Tr i u m p h s a n d F a i l u r e s i n W o r l d W a r I I 27 When he returned, he made it his business to find out “the real story” behind the Bulge. ”30 Why weren’t they? One reason was a Headquarters failure to think about the possible causes for the absence of high-level ultra. Always alert to the danger of having their signals intercepted and read, the German High Command apparently had decided to rely, for their high-level exchanges, on land lines rather than radio transmissions.
Their actions in Eastern Europe, the Chinese Communist seizure of large areas of China, and the energetic actions of the Communist parties in Western Europe were all considered proof that the USSR intended world domination. Very few thoughtful Americans, in or out of government, agreed with the exponents of preventive war, but the question of Soviet intentions had clearly become a matter for intelligence study and analysis. ” It reflected, I believe, the thinking of most Soviet specialists at the time.
A commitment to established plans and an unwillingness to be flexible or consider different and perhaps riskier alternatives (such as Patton’s proposal to move rapidly into the Reich in August 1944, and various possible responses to the anti-Hitler plotting and to the turmoil in the German army after the assassination attempt). 6. A moral self-righteousness and political naïveté that blinded the Allied political and military leaders to the efforts of moderates in Germany, who had for years and at great personal risk plotted to unseat the Nazi regime.